Against Explanatory Monism

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One of many problematic ways of reasoning about the world characteristic of post-Enlightenment thought is what might be called explanatory monism. Explanatory monism occurs when one attempts to capture inherently complex, multi-faceted, heterogeneous phenomena in terms of an oversimplified or reductionistic explanatory framework. It is ‘monistic’ in the sense that a single overarching Idea is thought sufficient to explain, if not entirely, at least in the essential or most important aspects, such highly complex and heterogeneous realities.

Note, however, that explanatory monism in this negative sense does not apply to cases in which the target phenomena are not so heterogeneous or complex so as not to admit of a single, unified, and in some sense ‘simple’ explanatory framework. Indeed, it is, to a certain extent, inherent to reasoning itself that it seeks to unify diverse phenomena under general principles. The issue I am identifying arises only when there is a “mismatch,” so to speak, between the heterogeneity of the phenomena and the homogeneity of the explanation.

To be more concrete, the sort of explanatory monism I have in mind occurs most frequently in explanatory frameworks directed at social and political phenomena. By their very nature, such phenomena are extraordinarily complex and heterogeneous. For the total realities we refer to under the headings of “the social” and “the political” all involve nearly infinitely complex causal interactions between personal agency, individual and social belief systems, religious institutions, social institutions of various kinds (families, clubs, schools, etc.), governmental institutions of various kinds (judicial, executive, legislative; national, local, regional; etc.), a plurality of economic forces (the profit motive, realities of trade, supply, demand, scarcity), and geographical/environmental realities. In this sense, socio-political reality is akin to the reality presented to us by ecosystems. The reality of a coral reef or rainforest, for example, is radically heterogeneous and multi-faceted, consisting of a bewildering causal network consisting of the individual behaviors of distinct animals, the presence of various flora and fauna, the relations of competition, mutual dependence, predation, and symbiosis between these flora and fauna; the influence of climate, the seasons, and daily weather; and so on.

In the face of the radically heterogeneous and complex reality of the socio-political sphere, much post-Enlightenment thought has fallen prey to a totally inadequate explanatory monism. It has been thought that socio-political reality can be reduced to and explained by simple “laws,” in much the same way that the movement of heavenly bodies was explained by “laws” of motion, or sight by “laws” of optics, or heat by “laws” of thermodynamics. As many have observed, the social sciences, and political theory, fell prey to a kind of scientism in the wake of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment. Because frameworks according to which natural phenomena could be explained by simple laws were so wildly successful in the physical sciences, it was thought (wrongly) that analogous frameworks should be applied to, and would be workable for, the sphere of the socio-political. This inference was and is mistaken, however, because the target phenomena for which simple law-like explanations work in the natural sciences are, as a general rule, simple and homogenous in themselves (motion of bodies with mass, the speed of light, the propagation of waves, etc.). And, indeed, even these ‘laws’ often only hold under ideal conditions, where the influence of the causal powers of other substances are either theoretically or experimentally controlled for. (What natural laws even are is a discussion for another time - suffice it to say I agree with those neo-Aristotelians like Nancy Cartwright and Alexander Bird that natural laws are simply generalizations concerning the causal powers inherent in the essences of existing substances.)

So, both in academia and through a trickle-down effect, it became popular to attempt to explain socio-political phenomena, and to diagnosis socio-political ills, in terms of such simple, “law-like” theories. And this tendency can be seen in various modern political ideologies.

For a certain kind of Marxist, nearly all socio-political reality can be understood in terms of relations of labor and class conflict, and so, by implication, the social and moral ills of society can be attributed to something as simple as “Capitalism” or “the oppression of the Bourgeoisie/Corporations.” Accordingly, we need only change the labor relations, and most if not all of our social and moral pathologies will resolve themselves. Similarly, for the Foucaultian, nearly all socio-political reality can be understood in terms of relations of power, and so, by implication, our moral and social ills can be reduced to various kinds of power imbalance or conflict. Accordingly, once we fix the power relations, most if not all of the moral and social pathologies should resolves themselves.

Similarly, for a certain kind of libertarian, nearly all socio-political reality can be understood merely in terms of the interactions of self-interested individual agents. Consequently, our social and moral ills can ultimately be attributed only to the failure of individual actors to behave rationally, morally, or in their true self-interest. The way to resolve these pathologies, then, can only be by influencing individual decisions. Or again, according to some, perhaps all socio-political reality can primarily be understood as arising from “culture” (or perhaps “sub-cultures”), and so we need only influence the culture in order to ameliorate our social and moral ills.

In all such cases, there appears to be an implicit assumption that socio-political reality, although seemingly causally pluriform, is in reality causally monistic: There is only one, or perhaps just a few, fundamental kind of causation operative in the socio-political sphere, and all other apparent causation can be reduced to this more fundamental kind of causation. For those of one political persuasion, this tends to be a “top-down” explanatory reductionism that denies the true causal impact on socio-political reality of individual persons and their beliefs, desires, motives, virtues, and vices. For those of another persuasion, this tends to be a “bottom-up” explanatory reductionism that denies the true causal impact on socio-political reality of institutions, economic and material conditions, and more generally larger social systems.

Both, in my view, are clearly mistaken, and rob aspects or “levels” of socio-political reality of the causal power they seem clearly to possess. Social reality, on this more traditional, pre-Enlightenment view (though defended during the Enlightenment by figures like Edmund Burke), is more like an open-ended ecosystem than a law-like machine: It consists of various kinds of causal influence and power, interacting in highly complex and dynamic ways: people and their beliefs, desires, vices, and virtues, influencing institutions and economic forces; institutions and economic forces influencing people and their beliefs, desires, vices, and virtues; mediating social institutions like churches, schools, and clubs being influenced by, and in turn influencing, both individual behavior and economic and political realities; and so on, and so forth. Socio-political reality, on this view, is like a vast system of causal nexuses and feedback loops, impossible to reduce to only one kind or level of causation. Accordingly, in diagnosing and seeking to resolve social and moral ills, any attempt to emphasize only one level or aspect of causation in the social sphere is bound to fail.

But it is not only bound to fail, it is also bound to result in injustice. For the top-down explanatory monist, justice at the individual level may be delayed or ignored until the “Real” issues are addressed at the systemic/economic/political level. Similarly, for the bottom-up explanatory monist, justice at the systemic, institutional, or economic levels may be delayed or ignored until the “Real” issues are addressed at the individual/cultural level.

By contrast, to recognize the true, pluriform and layered causal reality of socio-political life is to never have an excuse to delay justice or remain passive. For some level or aspect of social reality, a level or aspect with true causal power that cannot be reduced to another, is always available to us to influence for the good. It is also to see reality as it truly is: a diverse world of diverse causal powers possessed by diverse substances and processes.